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Introduction
When he was developing an innovative approach to the question of nation-
alism, Ernest Gellner (1993) suggested that the socio-political and economic
dynamics of the modern age fostered the congruence of political and
cultural realms. This view implied that the modern state was the state of a
territorially and ethno-culturally bounded society. It was through the
consolidation of this modern tendency that the demarcation lines between
the notions of state-membership (citizenship) and ethno-cultural member-
ship (nationality) gradually disappeared. The connotation of “nation-state”
symbolized the political extension of a cultural community. Although a
clear-cut distinction was drawn between “western” (civic) and “eastern”
(ethnic) models (Kohn 1965; Brubaker 1992), nationalism, as an ideology
and political project, has sought an ideal fusion between citizenship and
nationality. Both civic and ethnic models, implicitly or explicitly, have situ-
ated ethno-cultural identity at the core of the linkage between citizens and
the state (Özdoğan 2000). It has been generally believed that a state’s citizens
should be composed of its nationals, both civic and ethnic members of the
state (Oommen 1997).
However, nationalism as a theoretical and political project has largely run
counter to the diverse circumstances of modern times. Only a few of the
world’s existing states have accomplished the homogeneity of a nation-state.
Ethno-cultural diversity, instead, has remained an integral feature of
modern conditions (Connor 1994). It has become evident that notions of
citizenship and nationality are not synonymous but inherently refer to two
different sources of identity, that is, legal-political and ethno-cultural. In
these circumstances, the possibility of developing genuine equality between
the “national” and “non-national” citizens of a country has depended on
the capacity to create a complete disassociation between the two concepts.
Otherwise, it is argued, the concept of citizenship would come to relinquish
its inclusive substance and begin to operate as an instrument of exclusion
for those sections of the state’s population who remain outside the “imag-
ined” category of ethno-cultural designation (Schnapper 1998).
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Nevertheless, ethno-cultural neutrality, as Kymlicka and Norman (2000)
have recently demonstrated, has remained a myth even for the liberal democ-
racies of the Western world, where a dominant ethno-cultural substance has
frequently violated the legal-political inclusiveness of citizenship. The
rhetoric of citizenship has, in most cases, been historically advanced at the
expense of ethno-cultural diversity. There has existed a potential tension
between the notion of universal citizenship and ethno-linguistic and reli-
gious particularities of minority groups. Because of this, notwithstanding
universal premises of the concept of citizenship, the practice has tended to
create a duality between two categories of citizens, those who belong to the
majority and those who are outside the category of mainstream identifica-
tion.
The traditional position of non-Muslim minorities in Turkey has
presented a good example of the citizenship duality inherent in the practices
of a multi-cultural context. Thus, despite the fact that the republican state
adopted a legal-political neutrality in conceptualizing Turkish citizenship,
Turkish practices have often made a clear distinction between “national”
and “formal” citizens of the country. In so doing, universal implications of
citizenship status have been narrowed by the exclusivist conceptualization of
nationality. The Turkish citizenship practices have, therefore, created a
constant stalemate, blocking the building of a true compromise between the
universal implications of citizenship status and the “non-national” position
of the non-Muslim minorities.
I will review this republican duality as it relates to the citizenship status of
non-Muslim minorities in Turkey, focusing merely on Turkish political
culture and the Muslim-inclusive formulation of Turkish nationalism.
Therefore, this chapter will, first, briefly examine major aspects of Ottoman
rule relating to the issue of minority-majority classification and the ways of
minority treatment. Second, in connection with the former, the constitution
of minority and majority categories of the republican state will be discussed.
Here, the eventual emergence of the legal-political status of minorities, both
in the context of the Peace Treaty of Lausanne and the Turkish constitu-
tional settings, will be reviewed. Third, by looking at the republican
treatment of minorities, the practice of this legal-political background will
be elaborated. Finally, taking into consideration that the traditional basis of
minority citizenship has recently began to lose effect, I will point out some
current trends which have begun to transform the classical practices and
parameters of the established regime.
The Ottoman legacy
Although Western politicians and travelers used to designate the Ottoman
Empire as “Turkey” and its rulers as “Turks,” this European ethnic catego-
rization was no more than a misrepresentation of the Ottoman reality
(İnalcık 1996: 19). The Ottoman Empire was not a Turkish state in the
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modern sense of the word, but a multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multi-
lingual Islamic empire. Its socio-political, economic and judicial system
rested largely upon the instructions of Islamic law (Berkes 1998: 14). It was
because of this that, although ethno-lingual differentiation was not
unknown to the Ottoman world, religious belief signified the prime source
of identity, both before the state authorities and in the eyes of the general
public (Davison 1954: 844). The imperial order (nizam), hence, incorporated
a policy of ethno-lingual indifference and governed religious diversity exclu-
sively with a long-established Islamic instrument, the millet system.
Accordingly, while granting official recognition to the corporate existence of
the Greek Orthodox, Armenian-Gregorian and Jewish subjects, the Muslim
population was totalized within a uniform category of Muslim millet. Non-
Muslim communities were accorded a privilege of spiritual and temporal
autonomy on questions of taxation, education, religious practices, and judi-
cial proceedings that facilitated the protection and promotion of their
ethno-cultural characteristics (Braude and Lewis 1982).
However, communal autonomy in the Ottoman context did not mean
equality. The functioning of the Ottoman nizam depended not upon the
principle of equality but on an inegalitarian version of justice (adalet) which
recognized equality neither between the rulers and the ruled nor among the
different sections of the ruled. The meaning of adalet, instead, prescribed
for each of the communal groups a legal status no less and no more than
they deserved (Berkes 1998: 11). Immunities and the privileges of the millet
system relied on an ontological inequality formulated in the Islamic maxim
of dhimma in which believers (Muslims) and non-believers (dhimmis) were
strictly separated from each other in terms of civil, political and legal status
(Gibb and Bowen 1962: 207–8). Thus, notwithstanding the fact that they
were members of the same political community, non-Muslim millets received
different, if not discriminatory, treatment, among others, in the affairs of
public employment, military obligation, judicial proceedings and taxation,
and even regarding styles and colors of dress (Bozkurt 1996: 7–32; Peters
1999).
Thus, state-membership and ethno-cultural membership were constituted
in the Ottoman context within two different realms. Legal status was
grounded not in the accomplishment of the former, but it was the latter
which decided peoples’ socio-political and legal position in the state. Peoples
were considered, first and foremost, as members of millet communities,
outside of which none could claim legal existence (Gibb and Bowen 1962:
211–12). In this form, the classical system displayed more the characteristics
of a “federation of millets” or of “umma communities” having no common
identity and legal status independent of religiously delimited communal
affiliations. Administrative organization incorporated inward-closed and
strictly separated communities of religion which lived side-by-side but sepa-
rate from each other. As a result, neither the concept nor the practice of
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citizenship, involving equal rights and obligations, appeared in the
Ottoman Empire before the nineteenth century (Davison 1954: 845).
Nevertheless, the classical millet system, despite its inegalitarian ramifica-
tions, functioned well as long as religion remained the dominant source of
identity for all Ottoman subjects. Neither did the communities challenge its
premises nor did the imperial administration trouble itself with the creation
of a universal status of citizenship. However, after the influence of the
French Revolution, the principles of liberty, equality and “nationality” had
infiltrated the Ottoman lands by the early nineteenth century, the classical
nizam began to lose its legitimate grounds. A dramatic transformation
occurred in the non-national millet identities and loyalties toward ethno-
linguistic and territorial particularities. Non-Muslim minority nationalism
came to preoccupy administrative minds in the empire. It was in this context
that the Sublime Porte began to feel an urgent need to substitute inegali-
tarian aspects of the classical system with a substantive equality of Ottoman
citizenship cutting across ethno-linguistic, religious and sectarian affiliations
(Lewis 1965).
At this stage, the Ottoman rulers adopted the reformist policy of
ittihad-ı anasır (union of elements) which aimed at substituting the clas-
sical millet system with an egalitarian project of Ottomanism. To this
end, leading documents of the reform process in the nineteenth century,
the so-called Tanzimat era, addressed the civil, political and legal
equality of Ottoman subjects. Discriminatory practices in the affairs of
judiciary, taxation, military obligation, public employment and those
relating to peoples’ everyday circumstances were gradually renounced.1
The first Ottoman Constitution (1876) affirmed that apart from religious
matters, Muslim and non-Muslims had identical rights and obligations.
The same constitution stipulated that all of the Ottoman peoples, whether
Muslim or non-Muslim, were to be considered “Ottoman” in terms of
national affiliation, irrespective of religious and sectarian origins (Kili
and Gözübüyük 1985: 31–44). Depending on this egalitarian articulation
of the law and the legal-political formulation of nationality, citizenship
and national affiliation converged. From the political point of view, there-
fore, the traditional discrepancy between state membership and communal
membership, in principle, was eliminated to a considerable degree in the
Ottoman context.
The reform period attempted to dissolve ethno-religious and legal
compartmentalization within an inclusive formula of citizenship and nation-
ality. However, what Ottoman authorities would not see, if they wanted to
see, was the fact that the non-Muslim minorities were not seeking equality
within, but political liberation without, the state. This is why civil and polit-
ical liberties brought neither an integrated Ottoman society of citizens, nor
did it halt the non-Muslim minorities’ nationalist aspirations. The tradi-
tional duality between the notion of Ottoman citizenship consisting of
equal individuals and the corporate structures of the millet system remained
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unsolved. The political project of ittihad-ı anasır which marked the Ottoman
policies of modernization, therefore, culminated in a great failure. The
Christian communities moved out of millet consciousness directly into a
national consciousness without ever accepting Ottoman citizenship
(Davison 1963: 407–8). Once touched by the winds of nationalism, tradi-
tional millet compartmentalization resulted not in the emergence of an
integrated “Ottoman nation” but national states of non-Muslim minorities.
Greece, Serbia, Romania, Montenegro and Bulgaria ultimately declared
their independence. Moreover, even some of the Muslim elements, including
Albanians and Arabs, had joined in this ethnic dismemberment by the turn
of the century. When the final collapse came with the Treaty of Sèvres
(1920) in the aftermath of World War I (WWI), the disintegration of the
empire along the lines of minority identities was almost complete.2
The failure of the politics of ittihad-ı anasır aroused much resentment
among the Muslim people and the rulers of the empire, prominently the
Turks, who had invested great hopes in the principle of citizenship equality
as a means of saving the state from collapse. Non-Muslim minorities and the
persistence of millet divisions, hence, came to be considered one of the
major causes behind the dissolution of the empire. As a result, minority
issues lost their naivety in the eyes of the Turkish statesmen, who came to
see minority rights not as a matter of respect, freedom, liberty or equality
within the borders of a shared polity, but more as the instrument of ethnic
dismemberment and as a pretext for external interference. It was this legacy
that aroused a general distrust, suspicion and hatred against minority claims
in Turkey that greatly constrained the issue of minority rights and the citi-
zenship position of minorities in the republican period.
The republican regime
The Treaty of Sèvres marked the final partition of the country among
minority nationalities aided by the diplomatic and armed support of the
Allied powers. Against this state of affairs, nationalist leaders, led by
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, fought a war of national liberation between 1919
and 1922, during which time Turkish politics underwent a process of transi-
tion from a multi-national empire to a relatively homogeneous nation-state.
It was in this period, having learned much from the fact that the universalist
project of Ottoman citizenship had lost meaning in the nationalist aspira-
tions of the non-Muslim minorities, that the founding leaders came to favor
the creation of a secular minority policy, on the one hand, and a religiously
delimited national vision, on the other.
In doing this, unlike the millet-system-like formulations, the Turkish
authorities affirmed the then prevailing standards of minority treatment
outlined in the Minorities Treaties of the post-WWI European context.3 As
is well-known, while extending the concern of minority protection from reli-
gious groups to linguistic and racial (ethnic) elements and from state-to-state
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practices into a limited international regime vested in the discretion of the
League of Nations, the treaties brought innovative changes to the traditional
framework of minority rights in Europe. Apart from group-specific regula-
tions of differential treatment, minority peoples were provided with
universal principles of citizenship status (Rosting 1923). In the aftermath of
the liberation war, the founding leaders also agreed on the equal accommo-
dation of minority distinctions in Turkey. To this end, articles 37–45 of the
Peace Treaty of Lausanne (24 July 1923), that is the Turkish equivalent of
the Minorities Treaties, were assigned to the issue of minority protection
(Hurewitz 1956: 119–27).
It is significant to note here that, though an open commitment was
declared within the framework of the Minorities Treaties, the Turkish treaty
drifted from its contemporaries in specifying its beneficiaries. In the view of
the Turkish authorities, ethnic and linguistic classification could not be
reconciled with the traditional form of socio-political and legal divisions
that had hitherto rested in the Turkish context on peoples’ religious distinc-
tions. The Turkish leaders insisted that Turkey involve no minority on the
basis of ethno-linguistic or racial distinctions except those of the historically
constituted non-Muslim communities (Rıza 1999: 103).4 The Lausanne
document, hence, specified that the wording “minorities” incorporated in
the Treaty indicated nothing but the “non-Muslim minorities” resident in
Turkey. Consequently, following the religious legacy of the classical millet
system, only the Greeks, Armenians and Jews were allowed to benefit from
the effect of minority provisions. Turkish-Muslim peoples, whatever their
ethno-lingual and sectarian differences, were totalized under an imagined
unity of national category.
Unlike minority/majority classification, the scope of rights, nevertheless,
was almost completely detached from the imprints of traditional Turkish
practices. Aware of the fact that the political, legal and administrative
grounds of a national formation would necessarily seek the establishment of
a direct linkage between citizens and the state, the founding leaders were
convinced that corporate aspects of the millet system could no longer be
maintained. Primarily, minority provisions of the Lausanne document
considered members of the non-Muslim communities individual citizens of
the republican state, independent of their religious or sectarian affiliations.
In the new regime, therefore, communal membership, if it ever existed,
remained secondary in deciding the legal status of the non-Muslim peoples.
Unlike the dual application of the late Ottoman system, the citizenship
status of minorities was expected to dominate their communal membership.
It was for this reason that rights and freedoms specified in the document
directly addressed the religious, linguistic and cultural peculiarities of
“Turkish nationals belonging to non-Muslim minorities.”
The minority section of the Lausanne Treaty, therefore, aimed first at
protecting and reproducing the distinct identities of non-Muslim Turkish
citizens. To this end, the Turkish government undertook to grant positive
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measures of differential treatment for members of non-Muslim minorities in
education, religious practices and charitable foundations. It was affirmed
that non-Muslim citizens would establish, manage and control their own
charitable, religious and social institutions and schools in which they would
freely use their own language and exercise their own religious instructions
(Art. 40). Provided that teaching of the Turkish (official) language remained
obligatory, it was recognized that minorities would receive primary instruc-
tion in those regions or districts where they constituted a considerable
proportion of the resident population. In the same areas, the government
also undertook to give financial support, particularly to their educational
activities (Art. 41).
After group-specific concerns were secured, minority provisions assured
that the act of differential treatment would by no means be understood
against the principle of citizenship equality. In order to avoid the emergence
of an adverse development, minority-specific rights were substantively
supplemented in the Turkish treaty with those egalitarian measures of civil
and political equality grounded in the citizenship status of minority individ-
uals. In this respect, the provisions guaranteed full and complete protection
of life and liberty to all inhabitants of the country without distinction of
birth, nationality, language, ethnicity or religion (Art. 38). In other articles,
it was affirmed that “Turkish nationals belonging to non-Muslim minorities
will enjoy the same civil and political rights as Muslims … shall be equal
before the law … [and in] admission to public employment, functions and
honors, or the exercise of professions and industries.” Notwithstanding the
existence of official language, the Treaty further stipulated that “no restric-
tions shall be imposed on the free use by any Turkish national of any
language in private intercourse, in commerce, religion, in the press and
publications of any kind or at public meetings … [and] before the courts”
(Art. 39).
Having guaranteed both the individual and group-specific dimensions of
minority existence, the republican state established legal diversity without
violating universal premises of citizenship status. The new framework
affirmed that minority individuals would freely enjoy the benefits of equal
Turkish citizenship as well as their particular characteristics. Although they
might have lost the protective function of communal organizations, non-
Muslim minorities, being equal members of the Turkish citizenry, obtained,
henceforth, effective guarantees pertinent to the protection and promotion
of their ethno-cultural identities. However, even after the reception of the
Lausanne regime, centuries-old cleavages, confrontations and prejudices
continued to jeopardize possible grounds for creating an egalitarian coexis-
tence between Turkish-Muslim and non-Muslim sections of population.
Primary reflections of this foundational continuity appeared merely in the
dual formulation and practices of citizenship policies.
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Legal-political delimitation of the republican nationhood
The Ottomanist citizenship of ittihad-ı anasır projected an abstract Ottoman
nationhood superior to sub-national particularities of ethno-linguistic and
religious groupings. While considering each member of the population as
“Ottoman,” the imperial authorities devised no distinction between citizen-
ship and nationality. Once one received Ottoman citizenship, one was
secured membership in the Ottoman national category. However, under the
constraints of the failure of Ottomanist citizenship, the republican leaders
became convinced that it was no more than a dream to include non-Muslim
minorities in the national category of the new state. In their eyes, the
national struggle itself had partly been staged against the nationalist aspira-
tions of non-Muslim minorities (Oran 1997: 125–8). Because of this, the
republican authorities ceased to produce a political definition of nationality
and citizenship. The Ottomanist ideal of ittihad-ı anasır was by no means
replaced by an ethnic Turkism, but with a strong policy orientation of
itthad-ı anasır-ı İslamiye (union of Muslim elements). Adherence to a
common religion was placed in the foundational basis of the Turkish
national identity. The historical and cultural unity of the Muslim peoples,
resident within the borders of the new state, delimited also the majority
characteristics of the republican population.5
In conformity with this policy turn, Ziya Gökalp, the prominent ideo-
logue of Turkish nationalism, formulated a Muslim-inclusive concept of
Turkish citizenship and nationality. He believed that the main reason for the
failed development of Ottoman citizenship within an integrated nationhood
lay in the persistence of religious distinctions among subject peoples. The
religious diversity of the imperial population, for him, prevented develop-
ment of a national unity, which, in turn, culminated in the failure of its
citizenship policies (Berkes 1981: 78). A coherent nation, in his view, would
be established on the basis of a cultural community speaking one language
and professing one religion (Berkes 1981: 136–7). In so doing, Gökalp
closely connected the notions of citizenship and nationality and believed
that a workable citizenship policy would successfully be created, in the
Turkish context, only on the basis of the cultural community of the Turkish-
Muslim peoples of the country.
Similarly, in bringing a secular approach to the question of Turkish
national identity, Atatürk intended first to develop a comprehensive formula
of Turkish nationalism inclusive of all of the inhabitants of the country. In
doing this, he explicitly denied the constitutive function of religious
substance and promoted a common language, culture and history as the
bases of Turkish nationhood (Afetinan 1998: 18–25). However, his defini-
tion still concealed a religious implication in the sense that traditional
practices had hardly produced a cultural unity between Muslim and non-
Muslim citizens. If there was any cultural, historical or linguistic affinity, it
had been generated among the members of the same religious community.
The designation of the “cultural community of citizens,” therefore, indicated
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a national category consisting of the Muslim community of citizens. Having
been aware of this historical background, Atatürk, in another definition,
limited membership of Turkish nationality to those citizens who had partici-
pated in the founding process of the Republic, in which non-Muslim citizens
had been completely excluded (Afetinan 1998: 18).
Thus, Turkish practices, by the early years of the republican regime, came
to articulate a close association between citizenship and nationality based on
the Muslim characteristics of the population. The same rationality also
affected the formal definition of Turkish citizenship. The parliamentary
elaboration of the 1924 constitution, in this sense, stipulated that formal
membership of the Turkish citizenry was not sufficient to guarantee the full-
fledged scope of citizenship status. Although the constitution (Art. 88) laid
down that “the name Turk, as regards to citizenship, shall be understood to
include all citizens of the Turkish Republic without distinction of, or refer-
ence to, race or religion,” the drafting authorities denied formulating an
identical citizenship status equally applicable to Turkish-Muslim and non-
Muslim sections of the population.6 While articulating a civic definition of
Turkish nationality, contrary to what the principles of civil and political
equality might imply, the inclusive concept of the name “Turk” was limited
to the cultural community of Turkish-Muslim peoples. A strict distinction
between possession of “Turkish nationality” (milliyet) and “Turkish citizen-
ship” (tabiiyet) was preserved. In doing this, non-Muslim minorities were
included in the formal definition of Turkish citizenship, but excluded even
from the legal-political content of Turkish nationhood (Toker 1979: 361–4).
Depending on this nationality/citizenship differentiation, citizenship
practices lost their neutrality in the Turkish context in terms of ethno-
cultural particularities. Following the same differentiation, the republican
regime instead opted to create two categories of citizens: “national citizens”
(citizens by nationality) and “formal citizens” (citizens by law). In this case,
notwithstanding the civic features of the legal definition, the distinction of
nationality carried two significant implications for Turkish citizenship prac-
tices as they related to the issue of minority treatment. On the one hand,
with the Muslim-inclusive formulation of nationality, which superseded the
ethno-lingual and sectarian differences of Muslim citizens, the Ottoman
Muslim millet was culturally, legally, politically and practically reproduced
within the borders of the new state. The full-fledged scope of citizenship was
largely identified with ethno-cultural membership of the Turkish nation.
This Muslim-inclusive nationality provided legal equality for Turkish-
Muslim citizens irrespective of their sub-national characteristics. But, since
the uniform designation of national citizenship denied public expression of
the Muslim population’s ethno-cultural distinctions, the socio-political and
legal ramifications of equal treatment were reflected in an understanding
and practice of unanimous treatment. Second, since the ratification of the
Lausanne Treaty, the republican state has extended official recognition and
measures of differential treatment to members of non-Muslim minorities.
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However, because of their national “otherness,” in contravention of the
Lausanne commitments, almost no compromise could be accomplished
between the principles of citizenship equality and differential treatment on
the part of the non-Muslim minorities.
Dual practices of Turkish citizenship
The dual formulation of Turkish citizenship has operated in an assimila-
tionist manner with respect to the Turkish-Muslim elements. Since they have
historically represented ethno-cultural others of the Turkish-Muslim popu-
lation, the same formula has shown an exclusivist attitude toward members
of the non-Muslim minorities. The demographic, linguistic, cultural and
economic policies of nationalism, which marked, in particular, the single-
party period of the new state (1923–50), have, therefore, advanced at the
expense of non-Muslim minorities’ ethno-cultural, demographic and
economic presence in the country.
In fact, the official reception of the Lausanne commitments was accompa-
nied by an act of national homogenization in terms of religious affiliation.
Unwilling to live with a larger minority population, the Turkish and Greek
governments agreed in 1923 on the exchange of kin groups living on the land
of the other country. By the time it was completed, toward the end of the
1920s, more than 1.5 million people of minorities had been relocated.7
Interestingly, in conformity with the premises of Turkish national formation,
throughout the implementation of the exchange, citizenship status was
bestowed upon religious kin resident in the Greek state. A person’s creed
determined their national and citizenship position as well. The population
exchange, hence, resulted in “two deportations into exile, of Christian Turks
to Greece and of Muslim Turks to Turkey” (Lewis 1968: 355). Apart from
Greek-speaking ones, the Turkish government exchanged its Turkish-
speaking Orthodox citizens with many non-Turkish-speaking Muslims who
were granted full and complete Turkish citizenship (Psomiades 1968: 60–8).
Coinciding with the years of “demographic nationalization,” the govern-
ment initiated a new process of exchange, particularly in the personnel of
those companies owned by non-Muslim minorities or foreign residents. The
companies were compelled to exchange their foreign and non-Muslim staff
with Muslim-Turkish citizens (Alexandris 1992: 111). It is estimated that by
the year 1926 approximately 5,000 employees from the Greek minority had
already been replaced with Muslim-Turks (Alexandris 1992: 110). Indicating
the inegalitarian effect of “formal citizenship,” the government blocked their
capacity in public employment as well. The Law of Public Employment,
dated 1926, conditioned public employment on “being Turk” and not on
“being a Turkish citizen.” Hence, since non-Muslim minorities were consid-
ered Turkish only in terms of citizenship, the law, in practice, excluded
non-Muslim peoples from the state sector while reserving it exclusively for
the benefit of Turkish-Muslim citizens (Aktar 2000: 118–21).
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Hence, despite the fact that it ran counter to the principles of civil and
political equality, incorporated both within the Lausanne commitments and
subsequently adopted form of the republican citizenship, the employment
facilities of non-Muslim minorities were to a large extent curtailed.
Nevertheless, the dual version of republican citizenship had its most
enduring impact on the linguistic rights of minority citizens. Free use of
minority languages, both in public and private, had been guaranteed at
Lausanne. However, the task of liquidating minority languages was consid-
ered one of the immediate objectives of the Turkish national project. To this
end, from the early years of the republic, Turkish was emphasized as an essen-
tial criterion not only for Turkish nationality but also of the legal-political
category of Turkish citizenship. The political and intellectual circles of the
country came to believe that if one desired to have equal and full access to
Turkish citizenship, one must have adopted the Turkish language (Bali 2000:
107). Consequently, instruction in minority languages was greatly limited,
even in minority educational establishments (Sezer 1999: 17–35). Several
municipalities subsequently agreed to discourage minority citizens from
speaking a non-Turkish language in public places (Bali 2000: 108). In this
context, a widespread campaign of “Citizen! Speak Turkish” was instigated
in 1928 in the Turkish press, political circles and the general public against
both private and public use of minority tongues (Galanti 2000).
The “Citizen! Speak Turkish” campaign was practiced in the form of a
mass movement in which predominantly intellectual circles and ordinary
people took the lead. In that sense, it remained largely a “civil” act focusing
mainly on the non-Muslim residents of big cities. However, anti-minority
measures obtained an official and nation-wide characteristic when the
Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) enacted a new settlement law in
1934 (Official Gazette 1934). Having found the shortcomings of Ottoman
cosmopolitanism dangerous to the country’s national and territorial unity,
creating a homogeneous nation integrated in “one language, one sentiment
and one ideal” was stated as the main objective of the law (TGNA 1934:
69–70). To this end, the law, in conformity with its inherent duality, divided
Turkish citizens into two categories: those belonging to the Turkish cultural
and linguistic group and those who remained outside the borders of this
ethno-cultural designation. It was affirmed that the latter group of citizens
would be relocated based on the political, cultural and security considera-
tions of the state. Although the act aimed at relocating all non-Turkish
speaking citizens, its immediate effect fell on the “formal citizens.” Certain
parts of the country were closed to minority settlement. In the aftermath of
the legislation, for example, approximately two thirds of the regional Jews
were forced to evacuate Turkish Thrace (Karabatak 1996).
The overwhelming emphasis of the Turkish nationalism had shifted, by the
early 1930s, from common culture to ethnic cores (Oran 1997: 200–7).
However, this transformation by no means affected citizenship practices of
the republican state based upon the Muslim/non-Muslim duality of national
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classification.8 On the contrary, the increasing effect of nationalist feeling
further crystallized the foundational distinction between “national” and
“formal” citizens. At this stage, the implementation of the Capital Tax
presented the extreme example of the new tendency. From the legal point of
view, the law was enacted in 1942 in order to levy extraordinary wealth earned
by exploiting the then-prevailing wartime conditions (Ökte 1987: 1–14).
However, as Akar (2000: 166–7) has explained, the law entailed also the
implicit goal of achieving capital transfer from non-Muslim hands to Turkish-
Muslim citizens. As Prime Minister Saraçoğlu is reported to have stated:
The law carries, at the same time, a revolutionary nature in the sense
that it will create an opportunity to achieve our economic independence.
Because, in doing this, on the one hand, we will be able to hand over the
Turkish economy to Turks while eliminating the non-Turkish elements
from the Turkish economy. On the other hand, with this law, we will be
able to transfer immovable estates in Istanbul to Turkish peoples. … In
short, this law will put a final end to the economic superiority of non-
Turkish elements in the country.
(Barutçu 2001: 594)
The prime minister had given assurances on several occasions that the
government recognized no distinction between citizens of the country
(Yalman 1997: 1253–4). But the implementation of the tax proved the
reverse. The law, in practice, drifted from the principle of citizenship equality,
and classified taxpayers into two separate groups, Muslims and non-Muslims
(Ökte 1987: 19). The latter were arbitrarily assessed at a rate ten times higher
than the amounts levied on their Turkish-Muslim equivalents. When they
failed to pay, the assessed amount, along with movable and immovable prop-
erties belonging to the defaulters, were confiscated and sold at auction, 98
percent of which were bought out by Turkish-Muslim peoples and compa-
nies (Aktar 2000). Most significantly, those defaulters who declared that they
were unable to pay were sent to labor camps where they were expected to pay
their taxes by working for the state. Although liability to forced labor was, in
principle, applied to Turkish-Muslim defaulters as well, the government
refused to dispatch Muslim citizens to the labor camps (Ökte 1987: 71–2).
Toward the end of World War II, the Turkish government abolished both
the capital tax and the labor camps. In the aftermath of the war, Turkey
aligned itself with the Western world, which was preaching democratic
governments and individual human rights. Hence, the Turkish political system
began to transform autocratic structures into liberal-democratic models of
politics. Democratic transformation of the political system raised hopes
among the members of minority groups as well. Minority citizens came to
believe that religious, linguistic and cultural distinctions would no longer prej-
udice government policies and that the doors were being opened wide to equal
and non-discriminatory ways of minority treatment (Bali 1998).
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However, by the middle of the 1950s it became evident that the demo-
cratic context had by no means eradicated imprints of the foundational
duality rooted in the practical and legal basis of Turkish citizenship.
Political authorities and the general public continued to rank non-Muslim
Turkish citizens within exclusivist categories of “unreliable” and “foreign”
residents of the country. Yet, unlike the previous decades, the position of
non-Muslim minorities in Turkey began to be shaped this time not by
nationalist aspirations of internal politics but by diplomatic crises in
external relations. The first example of this attitude appeared in the mid-
1950s when Greek-Turkish relations became strained over Cyprus. With
Turkey and Greece disagreeing on the future status of the island, the posi-
tion of minority citizens in Turkey once again came under question. In
particular, instead of being viewed within the terms of Turkish citizenship,
members of the Greek minority came under suspicion as “foreign” and
“dangerous” elements of the country (Benlisoy 2000). Inflamed by the
Cyprus crisis, on the night of 6 September 1955 angry crowds destroyed
many shops, houses, factories, cultural centers and cemeteries belonging to
the Greek, Jewish and Armenian minorities in Istanbul and Izmir.9 The total
amount of damage assessed in Istanbul alone was estimated at $60 million
(Alexandris 1992: 259). Official sources stated that during the night three
people were killed and thirty injured (Dosdoğru 1993: 100). Helsinki Watch
subsequently reported that fifteen people had been killed (Human Rights
Watch 1992: 8).
September 6–7 was officially evaluated as the “expression of national
feelings” and a “national upheaval of the Turkish youth” (Birand et al. 1991:
124–5). From this point of view, leaving aside the damages, the affair under-
lined the vulnerable position of non-Muslim citizens. Despite the protective
framework of the Lausanne commitments and constitutional guarantees,
they indeed continued to constitute internal victims of an external crisis. The
persistence of diplomatic tensions between Greece and Turkey culminated in
the curtailment of minorities’ educational rights as well. The Theological
Seminary of Khalki was closed down in 1971. As the seminary had been the
centre of Orthodox ecclesiastical learning for centuries, the decision badly
affected the educational capacity of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate.
Because of this, the restoration of the institution to its original position still
occupies a prominent place in the issue of minority treatment in Turkey
(Özyılmaz, 2000). Also, during the 1970s and 1980s, attacks on Turkish
institutions and diplomats by the ASALA (Armenian Secret Army for the
Liberation of Armenia)10 made the social position of the Armenian
minority rather vulnerable. Although social unrest never turned into a real
violence, members of the Armenian minority increasingly found themselves
in an insecure situation, and eventually many opted to emigrate.
Inconvenient circumstances created by inegalitarian practices of the
Turkish citizenship resulted in the gradual homogenization of the Turkish
population in terms of religious affiliation. Though the first republican
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census had counted 2.8 percent non-Muslim citizens in 1927, the proportion
declined to 2 percent in 1935, 1.6 percent in 1945, 1.1 percent in 1955, 1
percent in 1960 and 0.8 percent in 1965 (Dündar 2000: 138). The 1992 esti-
mates showed that, apart from earlier migrations, during the previous three
decades more than 20,000 Armenians, 23,000 Jews and 55,000 Greeks had
emigrated from Turkey (Franz 1994: 331). Although there are now thought
to be 1.2 million non-Muslims in Turkey (Courbage and Fargues 1998: 115),
community sources recently counted no more than 50,000 Armenians,
27,000 Jews and 3,000 Greeks (Dündar 2000: 138).
To sum up, Turkish citizenship practice, with its “national”/“formal” clas-
sification, can be seen to a great extent to have followed the Muslim/dhimmi
compartmentalization of the imperial administration with its latent aspects
of inequality. Almost no compromise would be achieved between the prin-
ciple of civil and political equality of universal citizenship and the
group-specific dimension of minority rights. In practice, the notion of full
citizenship has been reserved exclusively for the Muslim sections of the
Turkish population. A minority intellectual recently remarked that though
minorities have formally been considered equal citizens of the country, prac-
tice has proved the reverse. This person observed that non-Muslim
minorities had come to believe today that only Muslim nationals were full
citizens of the republican state, and that they were not regarded as “citizens”
even within the limited meaning of the concept (Kaplan 2000).
Toward a system of substantive equality
Two major transformations that had gradually occurred in Turkey by the
middle of the 1980s greatly challenged the traditional parameters of repub-
lican citizenship practices relating to the official treatment of minority
concerns. On the one hand, the imagined unity of the anasır-ı İslamiye
entered into a process of ethno-linguistic and sectarian disintegration. It was
quite evident by the early 1990s that the monolithic formulation of the
“national citizenship” would no longer satisfy identity claims of the Turkish-
Muslim population in which ethnic Kurdish, Alevi sectarian and
fundamental Islamist sections began to seek ways for official recognition
and legal-political accommodation. The Turkish citizens of Kurdish origin,
for example, came to take an increasing interest in the issue of the official
recognition and free expression of their ethno-linguistic characteristics, in
particular in the fields of education, broadcast media and cultural activities
(Ekinci 1997).
On the other hand, the end of the Cold War unleashed minority prob-
lems all over Europe that had been frozen within the ideological
confrontations of the previous decades (Liebich 1996). The issue of the
equal accommodation of minority differences within a pluralist configura-
tion of legal-political settings began to preoccupy national and international
circles for both security and humanitarian considerations. Dedicated to this
302 The minority question
end, as well as the United Nations (UN), the Council of Europe (CoE), the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the
European Union (EU) gave greater significance to the protection and
promotion of cultural, linguistic and religious characteristics of minority
peoples. The Copenhagen Summit of the EU Council announced in 1993
that a candidate country must have achieved, before accession to the EU,
among others, “stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of
law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities” (Verheugen
2000: 440).
The two processes evolved simultaneously in Turkey. With the intensifica-
tion of EU-Turkey relations, Turkish governments became more prone to
increasing international pressure on those issues of democratization and
minority protection that strengthened, in turn, the effect of minority claims
within the country. Starting from 1998, for example, the EU Commission’s
annual reports have included a comprehensive assessment of the prevailing
conditions of minority treatment and the legal-political grounds of the
peaceful coexistence of sub-national differences in Turkey. Generally
speaking, referring directly to the traditional shortcomings of minority
protection in Turkey, the reports have insisted on the extension of official
recognition of the three non-Muslim communities (Armenians, Greeks, and
Jews) to the Kurdish, Alevi and Assyrian groups. Furthermore, it has been
recommended that Turkish governments facilitate the cultural and political
expression of minority differences whether Muslim or non-Muslim. In doing
this, the reports suggested that Turkey should undertake appropriate steps in
the direction of adopting its constitutional system to the contemporary
standards of minority protection specified in the latest documents of the
CoE (European Commission 1998; 1999; 2000a; 2001). It is well known that
these documents have laid down a number of group-specific rights and free-
doms pertinent to facilitating the free use of minority languages in
education, press and broadcast media. Accordingly, Turkey’s EU Accession
Partnership agreement has conditioned Turkish membership on the removal
of “any legal provisions forbidding the use by Turkish citizens of their
mother tongue in TV/radio broadcasting” in the short-term and in the field
of education in the medium-term (European Commission 2000b).
Thus, by the 1990s, internal and external changes had compelled Turkey
to revise its traditional practices with regard to citizenship issues. At this
stage, the question for the Turkish authorities was how to integrate various
ethnic, linguistic and religious groups without endangering the national and
territorial integrity of the state. The view in official circles was that the EU
standards would open a “Pandora’s box” in the country, paving the way to
the national and territorial disintegration of the republican state (Mete
1998: 18). More specifically, the act of granting public recognition to
group-specific rights was considered an attempt destined to restore the
conditions of the Treaty of Sèvres that had been defeated at Lausanne
(Demirel 1998a).
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Nevertheless, this did not mean that the dualistic conceptualization and
practices of Turkish citizenship, which had excluded non-Muslim minorities
from the benefits of genuine equality and denied the ethno-linguistic and
sectarian identities of Turkish-Muslim citizens, could still be maintained.
Partly under the impact of EU integration, and partly because of growing
identity claims from within Turkey, the Turkish authorities, in the past
decade, have come to admit group-specific particularities of both Muslim
and non-Muslim peoples on the grounds of “individual freedoms.”11 It was
in this context that the notion of constitutional citizenship was introduced
and began to be widely discussed by the Turkish public, intelligentsia and
state (İçduygu et al. 2000).
It is argued that the notion of constitutional citizenship would disasso-
ciate citizenship status from particularistic identities of peoples while
causing legal-political ramifications related to the concept of a neutral
source of identification for the whole of the population. In this view, it is
expected that the constitution would operate as an integrative mechanism
through which nationals of the country develop into a common polity
without divorcing themselves from their ethno-linguistic, sectarian and reli-
gious particularities (İçduygu et al. 2000: 192). In other words, situated
within the rights and obligations of an all-inclusive constitution, full and
equal citizenship is associated not with membership of an ethno-cultural
grouping but with the neutral framework of a legal setting. Thereby, it is
believed that the state would cease to act as the representative institution of
a single ethno-linguistic and religious community of citizens, but would
make room for the free expression of all the particular distinctions. In the
name of constitutional equality, thus, the state would take responsibility for
all of its citizens in protecting and promoting their ethno-cultural, religious
and linguistic interests.
The principle of constitutional citizenship, in this form, presented a
possibility not only for overcoming the traditional duality rooted in Turkish
citizenship practices, but also for meeting claims of social diversity brought
forth both by different sections of the Turkish population and the EU stan-
dards. Aware of this fact, Süleyman Demirel, the former president,
remarked on several occasions that the Turkish system would find a way to
accommodate its social diversity without violating the uniform image of
Turkish citizenship. While defending the development of a democratic
response to the prevailing problems of ethno-cultural diversity, the Prime
Minister Demirel remarked in 1992 that:
differences in culture, thought, belief, language and origin are natural
among our citizens. Such diversity is not a weakness in a democratic
and unitary state. In a unitary structure, various ethnic, cultural and
linguistic characteristics can be freely expressed, preserved and easily
developed. This does not weaken the unity of the nation, but
strengthens it. Everyone is equal and has the same status. The right to
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search for, preserve and develop one’s mother tongue, culture, history,
folklore and religious beliefs falls within the framework of human rights
and freedoms. The law will ensure these rights.
(Demirel 1992: 33)
“The law,” in Demirel’s view, is associated with the concept of constitu-
tional citizenship. The former president subsequently suggested that “while
granting universal citizenship equally to every individual member of the
state, constitutional citizenship would, at the same time, recognize their
ethnic and sectarian differences” (Demirel 1998b). This approach signaled
the substitution of the dualistic conceptualization of Turkish citizenship
with a legal diversity of Turkish nationals united only in respect to a formal
connection stipulating the same rights and obligations. Putting the matter
differently, it was believed that constitutional affiliation to the republic
would not necessarily make a “Turk,” even in the formal sense of the word,
but he or she would continue to claim his or her particular identity. In this
sense, the discourse of universal citizenship would no longer be used as a
neutralizing instrument over the particular identities of the Turkish peoples.
More specifically, in the words of Demirel (1998b), “a Turkish citizen of
Kurdish origin would freely express his or her ethno-cultural identity
provided that he or she proved loyal to the constitution and the essential
principles of the republic.”
While Demirel was concerned with examples of internal constraints on
the traditional parameters and practices of republican citizenship, the High
Board of Human Rights (HBHR 2000) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(MFA 2000) instigated similar debates for the sake of Turkey’s EU integra-
tion. Under the influence of EU standards, both public institutions recently
conceded that the persistence of a monolithic national identity had blocked
free expression of particular differences in religion, sect, language and
ethnicity. In order to improve Turkey’s human rights standards in the
contemporary world, the HBHR accordingly reported that social diversity
and national unity must be reconciled within an inclusive framework of a
“comprehensive constitutional citizenship.” The universal equality of citi-
zenship status, in other words, should not exclude peoples’ right to
difference without which those citizens who differ from the majority in
ethnic, linguistic, religious and cultural terms would be less equal in
enjoying contemporary standards of human rights. In so doing, it was
suggested, the indivisible unity of the country with its nation and territory
would continue to remain a constitutional principle and no threat would
arise from the official recognition of minority differences.
Although there is little compromise among the different departments of
the state,12 these reports indicated the emergence of a new trend in Turkey’s
citizenship policies, one inclined toward a system of socio-political and legal
equality within ethno-cultural diversity. Several steps have already been
taken in this direction. The ban on speaking Kurdish in public and using it
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in press and publications was canceled in 1991. Subsequently Demirel
declared, in a speech delivered in one of the Kurdish-populated cities, that
the state recognized existence of the “Kurdish reality.” In a similar manner,
though closed down several times after having been convicted of engaging in
separatist activities, a pro-Kurdish political party had eventually taken a
secure place in Turkish democracy by the middle of the 1990s. Tens of
municipalities have been governed for almost a decade by those mayors who
were elected from among the ranks of this pro-Kurdish party. Similarly, the
Supreme Court of Appeals passed a judgment on 31 March 2000 which
confirmed the freedom of individual citizens to give their children any
names of their choosing, including Kurdish names.
Furthermore, unlike the legal-political practices of the previous decades,
the republican state has undertaken several other steps to guarantee the
equal status of non-Muslim citizens. In this respect, public policies began for
the first time to disregard the traditional parameters of Turkish citizenship
and treat non-Muslim minorities on the same grounds as Turkish-Muslim
citizens. In December 1999, an official circular, for example, recognized that
non-Muslim minorities would no longer be required to seek permission from
the state in order to restore churches and other buildings belonging to
minority foundations. In the following year, the Turkish presidency issued a
message on the eve of the year 2000 to non-Muslim minority groups on the
occasion of Christmas and Hanukah (Radikal 2000b). The message carried
a symbolic significance in the sense that it confirmed the equal position of
non-Muslim citizens in the eyes of the authorities. Similarly, the Ministry of
Education, for the first time, attempted to eliminate prejudices about Gypsy
citizens from the national educational texts. To this end, the ministry issued
a circular in 2001 in order to cancel pejorative words used about Gypsies
from the dictionaries published by the same ministry.
Without doubt, recent political trends indicate the emergence of a
substantive transformation in the classic duality of Turkish citizenship prac-
tices. While non-Muslim minorities came to be treated with genuine equality
of citizenship, sub-national identities of the Muslim population began to
find an implicit recognition in the public realm of the state. Yet it seems too
early to talk about the consolidation of a comprehensive constitutional citi-
zenship expressed in a system of substantive equality tolerant of
ethno-linguistic, religious and sectarian differences between both Muslim
and non-Muslim members of the Turkish citizenry. It is significant to note
here that, at the time of writing this chapter, the TGNA has enacted
progressive reforms allowing the free use of minority languages and dialects,
whether Muslim or non-Muslim, in education and broadcast media. The
same reforms accord corporate-communal rights to non-Muslim pious foun-
dations relating to the issue of obtaining and disposing of real estate. The
policy implementation of the enacted laws and regulations indicate that
deepening innovative changes have occurred in Turkish citizenship practices.
This would be an appropriate topic for subsequent studies.
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Notes
1 The Imperial Rescript of Gülhane (1839) and the Reform Edict (1856) are the
pioneers of the Ottoman reform process in creating legal grounds of civil and
political equality between Muslim and non-Muslim subjects of the empire (see
Hurewitz 1956: 113–16, 149–53).
2 According to the provisions of the Treaty of Sèvres, of European Turkey only
Istanbul was to be left to Turkey; in Anatolia, an Armenian state and a Kurdish
state were to be created; part of western Anatolia was to be ceded to Greece (see
Hurewitz 1956: 81–7).
3 The fifth article of the National Pact (Misak-ı Milli), the provisions of which
outlined minimal objectives of the nationalist struggle, drawn up in 1920:
The rights of minorities as defined in the treaties concluded between the
Entente powers and their enemies and certain of their associates shall be
confirmed and assured by us -in reliance on the belief that the Muslim
minorities in neighboring countries will also be given the benefit of the same
rights.
(see Macfie 1996: 124–5)
4 The Turkish delegate indicated at Lausanne, in the Sub-Commission of
Minorities, that Turkish political culture limited minority status exclusively to
the case of the religious minorities, and that political expression of ethnic and
linguistic particularities remained alien to Turkish political history. Under these
circumstances, it was stated, the Turkish state should not be expected to grant
official recognition to ethnic and linguistic distinctions that existed among the
Turkish-Muslim population (see Meray 1969: 154, 160).
5 Concluding documents of the nationalist congresses of Erzurum and Sivas
proved that the “national” component of the Turkish national struggle connoted
Muslim residents of Anatolia whatever the ethno-linguistic and sectarian distinc-
tions (see Goloğlu 1968: 201–3; İğdemir 1969: 113–15).
6 The civic wording of the citizenship clause of the constitution remained intact
both in the 1961 (Art. 54) and the 1982 constitutions (Art. 66).
7 Toward the end of the Turkish national struggle, approximately 1,350,000
Anatolian Greeks migrated to Greece (Tekeli 1990: 61). With the implementation
of the Turkish-Greek population exchange, this number reached to an amount
exceeding 1,500,000 (Geray 1970: 10).
8 The Gagauz Turks of Romania, who spoke Turkish but were Orthodox Christian
in religion, were not allowed to migrate to Turkey in the mid-1930s. Because of
religious distinction, they were not considered within the conceptual borders of
Turkish national identity. In the same period, however, large groups of Balkan
Muslims, from different ethnic and linguistic backgrounds, were able to take
Turkish citizenship as equal members of the Turkish national category (see
Kirişçi 2000).
9 The damage in Istanbul included 1,004 houses, 4,348 shops, 27 pharmacies and
laboratories, 21 factories, 110 restaurants, cafes and hotels, 26 schools, 5 athletic
clubs and 2 cemeteries (Alexandris 1992: 259). In Izmir, the mass attacks resulted
in the destruction of 14 houses, 6 shops, 1 pavilion, the Greek consulate, and a
Greek church. It was reported that fifty-seven persons were wounded in the same
city (Kılıçdere 2000).
10 It was reported that between 1973 and 1985 ASALA staged 86 attacks against
Turkish nationals, killing 47 Turkish citizens, 32 of whom were officials, and
injuring 19 officials (Franz 1994: 327).
11 The Turkish National Programme submitted to the EU Commission considered
cultural and linguistic rights not within the terms of minority protection, but as
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“individual freedoms” to be granted to the benefit of all Turkish citizens irre-
spective of language, race, color, sex, political opinion, and philosophical or
religious belief (TNP 2000).
12 The National Security Council, which is one of the most influential constitu-
tional institutions in Turkish politics, has denied any deviation from the scope of
the Lausanne regime and the monolithic understanding of Turkish citizenship
on the grounds of preserving the territorial and national integrity of the republic
(Radikal 2000a).
References
Afetinan, A. (1998) Medeni Bilgiler ve M. Kemal Atatürk’ün El Yazmaları (Civil
Knowledge and Ataturk’s Unpublished Notes), Ankara: TTK.
Akar, R. (2000) Aşkale Yolcuları: Varlık Vergisi ve Çalışma Kampları (Passengers to
Aşkale: The Capital Tax and the Labour Camps), Istanbul: Belge Yayınları.
Aktar, A. (2000) Varlık Vergisi ve Türkleştirme Politikaları (The Capital Tax and the
Policies of Turkification), Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları.
Alexandris, A. (1992) The Greek Minority of Istanbul and Greek-Turkish Relations:
1918–1974, Athens: Center for Asia Minor Studies.
Bali, R. N. (1998) “Resmi İdeoloji ve Gayri Müslim Azınlıklar” (Official Ideology
and Non-Muslim Minorities), Birikim, January-February: 170–6.
——(2000) Cumhuriyet Yıllarında Türkiye Yahudileri: Bir Türkleştirme Serüveni
(1923–1945) (The Jews of the Republican Turkey: A Venture of Turkification),
Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları.
Barutçu, F. A. (2001) Siyasi Hatıralar: Milli Mücadeleden Demokrasiye (Political
Memoirs: From National Struggle to Democracy), vol. 1, Ankara: Yüzyıl Yayın-
ları.
Benlisoy, F. (2000) “6/7 Eylül Öncesinde Basında Rumlar” (Greeks in the Press
before the Affair of 6/7 September), Toplumsal Tarih, 81: 28–38.
Berkes, N. (1981) Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilisation: Selected Essays of
Ziya Gökalp, Westport CT: Greenwood Press.
——(1998) The Development of Secularism in Turkey, New York: Routledge.
Birand, M. A., Dündar, C. and Çaplı, B. (1991) Demirkırat: Bir Demokrasinin
Doğuşu (Iron Horse: Emergence of a Democracy), Istanbul: Milliyet Yayınları.
Bozkurt, G. (1996) Gayrimüslim Osmanlı Vatandaşlarının Hukuki Durumu:
1839–1914 (Legal Status of the Non-Muslim Ottoman Subjects), Ankara: TTK.
——(1996) Batı Hukukunun Türkiye’de Benimsenmsesi (The Reception of Western
Law in Turkey), Ankara: TTK.
Braude, B. and Lewis, B. (eds) Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: The Func-
tioning of a Plural Society, New York and London: Holmes & Meier.
Brubaker, R. (1992) Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany, Cambridge
MA and London: Harvard University Press.
Bulaç, A. (1992) “Sözleşme Temelinde Toplumsal Proje” (A Social Project on the
Basis of a Contract), Birikim, 40: 53–62.
Connor, W. (1994) “A Nation is a Nation, is a State, is an Ethnic Group, is a … ,” in
J. Hutchinson and A. Smith (eds) Nationalism, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Courbage, Y. and Fargues, F. (1998) Christians and Jews Under Islam, London and
New York: I. B. Tauris.
Davison, R. H. (1954) “Turkish Attitudes Concerning Christian-Muslim Equality in
the Nineteenth Century,” The American Historical Review, LIX (4): 844–64.
308 The minority question
——(1963) Reform in the Ottoman Empire: 1856–1876, Princeton: Princeton Univer-
sity Press.
Demirel, S. (1992) “Creating a Community of Equals: The Democratic Response to
Ethnic Diversity,” Harvard International Review, XV (1): 32–3.
——(1998a) “Güneydoğuda Sevr Deneniyor” (The Treaty of Sevres is Being Tried in
the Southeast), Milliyet, 22 August.
——(1998b) “Sigorta, Anayasal Vatandaşlık” (Constitutional Citizenship is the
Insurance), Milliyet, 22 August.
Dosdoğru, H. (1993) 6/7 Eylül Olayları (The Affair of 6/7 September), Istanbul:
Bağlam Yayınları.
Dündar, F. (2000) Türkiye Nüfus Sayımlarında Azınlıklar (Minorities in the National
Censuses of Turkey), Istanbul: Çiviyazıları.
Ekinci, T. Z. (1997) Vatandaşlık Açısından Kürt Sorunu ve Bir Çözüm Önesrisi (The
Kurdish Question from the Perspective of Citizenship and a Proposed Solution),
Istanbul: Küyerel Yayınları.
European Commission (1998) Regular Report from the Commission on Progress
Towards Accession of Turkey. Online. Available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/
enlargement/turkey/rep_11_98/b12.htm (accessed 15 February 2001).
——(1999) Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey’s Progress Towards Acces-
sion. Online. Available at http://europe.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_10_99/
pdf/eng/turkey (accessed 15 February 2001).
——(2000) Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey’s Progress Towards Acces-
sion. Online. Available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report/11_00/
pdf/en/tu (accessed 15 February 2001).
——(2001) Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey’s Progress Towards Acces-
sion. Online. Available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report2001/tu
(accessed 15 February 2001).
——(2000b) Accession Partnership for Turkey. Online. Available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/turkey/pdf/ap_turk_en.pdf (accessed 15
February 2001).
Franz, F. (1994) Population Policy in Turkey: Family Planning and Migration Between
1960 and 1992, Hamburg: Deutsches Orient-Institut.
Galanti, A. (2000) Vatandaş Türkçe Konuş Yahut Türkçe’nin Ta’mimi Meselesi:
Tarihi, İçtimai, Siyasi Tetkik (Citizen, Speak Turkish! or the Question of Dissemi-
nation of the Turkish Language: A Historical, Social and Political Analysis),
Ankara: Kebikeç Yayınları.
Gellner, E. (1993) Nations and Nationalism, Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press.
Geray, C. (1970) “Türkiyede Göçmen Hareketleri ve Göçmenlerin Yerleştirilmesi”
(Migratory Movements in Turkey and the Settlement of the Migrants), Amme
İdaresi Dergisi, 3 (4): 8–36.
Gibb, H. A. R. and Bowen, H. (1962) Islamic Society and the West: A Study on the
Impact of Western Civilisation on Moslem Culture in the Near East, London and
New York: Oxford University Press.
Goloğlu, M. (1968) Erzurum Kongresi (The Congress of Erzurum), Ankara: Nüve
Matbaası.
HBHR(High Board of Human Rights) (2000) “İnsan Hakları Koordinatör Üst
Kurulu Raporu” (The Report of the High Board of Human Rights), Radikal, 19
June.
The minority question 309
Human Rights Watch (1992) The Greeks of Turkey, New York and London: Human
Rights Watch.
Hurewitz, J. C. (1956) Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East: A Documentary
Record, New York and London: D. van Nostrand.
İnalcık, H. (1995) “Political Modernization in Turkey,” in R. E. Ward and D. A.
Rustow (eds) Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey, Oxford: Clarendon
Press.
——(1996) “The Meaning of Legacy: The Ottoman Case,” in L. C. Brown (ed.)
Imperial Legacy: The Ottoman Imprint on the Balkans and the Middle East, New
York: Columbia University Press.
İçduygu, A., Çolak, Y. and Soyarık, N. (2000) “What is the Matter with Citizenship?
A Turkish Debate,” in S. Kedourie (ed.) Seventy-five Years of the Turkish
Republic, London and Portland OR: Frank Cass.
İğdemir, U. (1969) Sivas Kongresi Tutanakları (Records of the Sivas Congress),
Ankara: TTK.
Kaplan, P. (2000) “Azınlıklar Konuşmaz” (Minorities Do Not Speak), Radikal, 26
March.
Karabatak, H. (1996) “Türkiye Azınlık Tarihine Bir Katkı: 1934 Trakya Olayları ve
Yahudiler” (A Contribution to the History of Minorities in Turkey: The 1934
Thracian Affairs and the Jews), Tarih ve Toplum, 146: 68–80.
Karpat, K. H. (1982) “Millets and Nationality: The Roots of Incongruity of Nation
and State in the Post-Ottoman Era,” in B. Braude and B. Lewis (eds) Christians
and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: The Functioning of a Plural Society, New York
and London: Holmes & Meier.
Kılıçdere, A. 2000. “İzmir’de 6/7 Eylül Olayları” (The Affair of 6/7 September in
İzmir), Toplumsal Tarih, 74: 34–41.
Kili, S. and Gözübüyük, Ş. (1985) Türk Anayasa Metinleri: Sened-i İttifak’tan
Günümüze (Constitutional Documents of Turkey: From the Deed of Alliance to
Today), Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları.
Kirişçi, K. (2000) “Disaggregating Turkish Citizenship and Immigration Practices,”
Middle Eastern Studies, 36 (3): 1–22.
Kohn, H. (1965) Nationalism: Its Meaning and History, Princeton, New York and
London: D. van Nostrand.
Kymlicka, W. and Norman, W. (2000) “Citizenship in Culturally Diverse Societies:
Issues, Contexts, and Concepts,” in W. Kymlicka and W. Norman (eds) Citizen-
ship in Diverse Societies, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lewis, B. (1965) “The Impact of the French Revolution on Turkey,” in G. S. Métraux
and F. Crouzet (eds) The New Asia: Readings in the History of Mankind, New
York and Toronto: New American Library.
——(1968) The Emergence of Modern Turkey, New York and Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Liebich, A. (1996) “Getting Better, Getting Worse,” Dissent, summer: 84–9.
Macfie, A. L. (1996) The Eastern Question: 1774–1923, London and New York:
Longman.
Meray, S. L. (1969) Lozan Barış Konferansı: Tutanaklar-Belgeler (The Peace Treaty of
Lausanne: Records and Documents), vols 1–2, Ankara: Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi
Yayınları.
Mete, N. (1998) “Azınlıklar Azar Mı?” (Would Minorities Get Out of Control?),
Haber, 12 (7–13 March).
310 The minority question
MFA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) (2000) “Raporlar Savaşı” (A War of Reports),
Radikal, 19 June.
Official Gazette (OG) (1934) Law no. 2510, Resmi Gazete (Official Gazette), 21 June.
Oommen, T. K. (1997) “Introduction: Conceptualising the Linkage Between Citizen-
ship and National Identity,” in T. K. Oommen (ed.) Citizenship and National
Identity: From Colonialism to Globalism, London: Sage.
Oran, B. (1997) Atatürk Milliyetçiliği: Resmi İdeoloji Dışı Bir İnceleme (Kemalist
Nationalism: A Non-Official Approach), Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi.
Ökte, F. (1987) The Tragedy of the Turkish Capital Tax, London and New Hamp-
shire: Croom Helm.
Özdoğan, G. Göksu (2000) “Civic Nation vs. Ethnic Nation: Transcending the
Duality?” in G. Göksü Özdoğan and G. Tokay (eds) Redefining the Nation State
and Citizen, Istanbul: Eren Yayıncılık.
Özyılmaz, E. (2000) Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu (The Seminar of Khalki), Ankara:
Tamga Yayıncılık.
Peters, R. (1999) “Islamic Law and Human Rights,” Islam and Christian-Muslim
Relations, 10 (1): 5–14.
Psomiades, H. J. (1968) The Eastern Question: The Last Phase, Institute for Balkan
Studies.
Verheugen, G. (2000) “The Enlargement of the European Union,” European Foreign
Affairs Review, 5: 439–44.
Radikal (2000a) “MGK 180 Derece Ters” (The View of the National Security
Council is 180 Degrees in Reverse), 19 June.
——(2000b) “Gayrimüslime Köşk Mesajı” (A Presidential Message to non-
Muslims), 23 December.
Rıza, N. (1999) Lozan Hatıraları (The Lausanne Memoirs), Istanbul: Boğaziçi
Yayınları.
Rosting, H. (1923) “Protection of Minorities by the League of Nations,” American
Journal of International Law, 17 (4): 641–60.
Schnapper, D. (1998) Community of Citizens: On the Modern Idea of Nationality,
New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers.
Sezer, A. (1999) Atatürk Döneminde Yabancı Okullar: 1923–1938 (Foreign Schools in
the Atatürk Period: 1923–1938), Ankara: TTK.
TGNA (Turkish Grand National Assembly) (1934) TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi (TGNA
Records), 4 (23): 67–160.
Tekeli, İ. (1990) “Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’ndan Günümüze Nüfusun Zorunlu Yer
Değiştirmesi” (Forced Migration From the Ottoman Empire to Today), Toplum
ve Bilim, 50: 49–71.
TNP (Turkish National Programme) (2001) National Programme for the Adoption of
the Acquis. Online. Available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/turkey/
pdf/npaa (accessed 15 February 2001).
Toker, Y. (1979) Milliyetçiliğin Yasal Kaynakları (The Official Sources of Nation-
alism), Istanbul: Tekin Yayınevi.
Yalman, A. E. (1997) Yakın Tarihte Gördüklerim ve Geçirdiklerim (Memoirs of the
Recent Past), vol. 2, Istanbul: Pera Yayınları.
The minority question 311
